Gabriel Reynolds, Faculty Contributor
Political commentators and public figures have a lot to say about the current troubles in the Middle East and North Africa, and most of what they say is wrong. Their failure to get things right is in part due to the rivalry between Democrats and Republicans which dominates American politics. In the debates over military intervention in Syria, for example, many Democrats have transformed themselves from doves into hawks. The same left-leaning politicians and commentators who attacked President Bush for his military interventions are now ready to support President Obama’s intervention. On the other side, not a few Republicans have transformed themselves from hawks into doves.
Commentary on the Middle East and North Africa is also influenced by a failure to appreciate the complications of politics and society in this region. This failure was evident in the breathless coverage of the protests––commonly referred to as the Arab Spring––that began in January 2011 in Tunisia and soon spread to Egypt, Libya and elsewhere. To many commentators these protests were something like the French Revolution. They were the beginning of a new era of freedom, secularism, democracy.
When these movements succeeded (at least in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya) in overthrowing dictators, many western observers assumed that a new era of freedom and happiness in the Middle East, a “springtime,” was soon to follow. Not a few commentators connected the Arab Spring to the influence of President Obama’s personality. Yet these days, with the rise of Islamist regimes, the return to military rule in Egypt and a bloody war in Syria, the term Arab Spring is no longer commonly heard.
One element (and there are others) of politics and society in the Middle East that western analysts generally miss is the importance of the sectarian rivalry between Sunnis and Shi’ites (this element is not particularly important in North Africa, where there are few Shi’ites). This rivalry has been central to the terrible and prolonged conflict in Syria.
In January of 2010 popular protests forced President Ben Ali to flee Tunisia. The next month Mubarak was ousted from Egypt. In the Fall of 2011 Gaddafi was captured, tortured and killed in Libya. Since that time political analysts have regularly predicted the imminent demise of Syria’s President Assad. And yet they have regularly been wrong. Today, two years later, he remains in his presidential palace in Damascus.
Political analysts have failed to appreciate the importance of the sectarian divisions that exist in Syria. Unlike Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the Muslim population of Syria is divided between Sunnis and Shi’ites—more specifically, a small offshoot of Shi’ism: the Alawites. In Syria Bashar al-Assad’s government has resisted the rebellion because of its reliable base of support among Syrian Alawites––a small but powerful minority––and because of the military resources it receives from the Shi’ite Iranian government, and the Shi’ite Lebanese militia Hezbollah.
The sectarian rivalry between Sunnis and Shi’ites is not a matter of religious disagreement per se. Sunnis and Shi’ites agree over most religious questions, including prayer, fasting, the Qur’an and the pilgrimage to Mecca. Their disagreements lie instead in history, or rather, in sacred history.
Islamic tradition traces the origin of the Sunni-Shi’ite division to the moment of the Prophet Muhammad’s death in AD 632. According to Islamic tradition he was succeeded by Abu Bakr, an elder companion (and father of Muhammad’s favorite wife, Aisha), who with the support of many pious Muslims became the first caliph, or leader, of the Islamic community. Shi’ites, however, insist that the Prophet had designated his cousin Ali as his successor, that Abu Bakr wrongfully usurped Ali’s rule (and, according to some, that Abu Bakr poisoned Fatima, wife of Ali and daughter of the Prophet).
Indeed Shi’ites insist that Ali was not only designated by the Prophet Muhammad, he was also chosen by God. They venerate Ali, and his descendants, and expect that one of his descendants will emerge in the end times to take revenge on Sunnis for their failure to heed God’s will.
For their part Sunnis not infrequently accuse Shi’ites of blasphemy for their veneration of Ali and his descendants. The prevalence of Sunni anti-Shi’ite feeling was suggested by a 2012 Pew Foundation survey, which revealed that only 42% of Sunnis in Egypt consider Shi’ites to be Muslims. A peculiar example of Sunni anti-Shi’ite sentiment was provided earlier this year by Fadel Shaker, a Lebanese pop-star turned militant. Shaker appeared in a YouTube video earlier this year performing a song based on a poem written by Usama Bin Laden. The poem includes a curse for the “unbelievers” generally. Shaker edited the text here. He curses the Rafida, a derogatory name for Shi’ites.
While Shaker was particularly concerned with the conflict in Syria, these days the struggle between Sunnis and Shi’ites extends well beyond the Syrian borders. The rivalry between these two groups is the principal dynamic in the terrible wave of violence that has engulfed Iraq since the US withdrawal. It is also a cause of violence in Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed the Sunni-Shi’ite rivalry has taken on the dimension of an international conflict. Those commentators who would like to start getting things right should learn to take it seriously.
Gabriel Reynolds is the Theology Department’s Director of Undergraduate Studies and Professor of Islamic Studies and Theology.